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The Mediatization of War:  A Comparison of the American 
and German Media Coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars1 
 
           By Gerd Horten  
 
  
The last fifty years have seen the further expansion of the role of media during times of war.  
Although no longer dominated by large-scale propaganda agencies as during the two world 
wars, the media nevertheless have become ever more integral to the planning and conduct of 
wars.  This article applies the concept of mediatization in an attempt to capture the ever 
increasing role of the media during war times as part of an ongoing and accelerating historical 
process.  It uses a comparative analysis to highlight the commonalities of this process as well as 
to emphasize national particularities. The article argues that the mediatization of war has 
significantly accelerated over the past fifty years and has established the media as the “fourth 
branch” of military operations, which is just as essential as the army, navy and air force.  
 
Introduction 
A new concept has emerged over the past decade in the discussion of the media’s impact 
on politics, society, and culture: mediatization. Mediatization research tries to analyze the 
dynamics of our increasingly media-saturated and media-driven societies, which are especially 
evident in high modern societies. Stig Hjarvard has defined mediatization as “the process 
whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and 
their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated 
into the operations of social institutions (family, work, politics, etc.) while at the same time 
acquiring the status of a social institution in their own right.”2 
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Two objections, in particular, have been raised in connection with this new terminology 
and concept. The first is that this inquiry into the centrality of the media has been the focus of 
media research all along, which highlights that mediatization has a long history. We need to 
think about mediatization in similar ways as other long-term—but distinct— developments such 
as globalization. Neither one of these processes is historically speaking new, yet both of them 
have accelerated to such a degree that their effects have become ever more apparent and 
profound. As Friedrich Krotz pointed out, “Mediatization thus should be defined as a historical, 
ongoing, long-term development in which more and more media emerge and are 
institutionalized.” The transition from stone tablets to papyrus, the invention of the printing press 
or the emergence of the electronic media are all earlier parts of this historical process. For many 
media scholars, mediatization is a grand concept on par with others such as commercialization, 
individualization and globalization, and they believe that it will become just as broadly 
recognized and applied.3 
The second objection has been raised primarily by British media scholars. Are the new 
terms, “mediatization” and “mediatized society,” really superior to the established concepts of 
“mediation” and “mediated society,” they ask? Mediatization scholars argue that the new terms 
are better suited to capture the broader processes implied in current media developments. 
Mediation, for example, is often used to describe direct, face-to-face communication or can be 
used to describe the relatively neutral process of relaying information. Utilizing the 
mediatization paradigm is better suited to analyze the increasingly complex and ubiquitous ways 
by which the media impact our lives. Gianpietro Mazzoleni put it most succinctly: “In brief, the 
concept of ‘mediatization of society’ indicates an extension of the influence of the media into all 
societal spheres.”4 Based on the thrust of current media research, it seems certain that the 
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concept of mediatization is here to stay. In fact, its usage is rapidly accelerating—in no small 
part driven by the dynamic expansion of the new media and their ever increasing applications. 
Whether we look at the development of online banking and online newspapers, the accelerating 
utilization of media and PR campaigns in politics or the transformation of personal 
communication, leisure and our work environments, we are all subject to the expanding 
dynamics of mediatization. 
 The goal of this article is to analyze the media coverage during wartime within the 
context of the mediatization paradigm. War and war reporting, like other sectors of our highly 
modern societies, have indeed become mediatized, and this history goes back a long way.5 In his 
study on war imagery, Gerhard Paul identified World War I as the first mediatized war. This war 
saw the development of large propaganda organizations in all combatant countries. Due to the 
vast expansion of newspapers and magazines as well as the development of film and radio 
broadcasting, government agencies were able to disseminate their propaganda swiftly and 
effectively. The professionalization of advertising and the strict censorship of news media were 
additional aspects of this initial mediatization of war.6 During World War II, these developments 
were further heightened and perfected. Hitler’s use of propaganda and the media are well known. 
In the United States as well, news censorship flourished even as new information modes such as 
live overseas broadcasts became feasible. More often than not, American propaganda was 
privatized, carried out by commercial advertising and media professionals and seamlessly 
inserted into radio broadcasts, mainstream films and popular magazines.7 
 The Vietnam and Iraq Wars seem particularly well suited to analyze the accelerating 
impact of the media on wars, since each took place during the next two phases of the 
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mediatization process. In the 1950s and 1960s, television came of age in the western world, and 
Vietnam became the first televised war. Likewise, the Iraq War of 2003 was fought in the midst 
of the digital age, shaped by the novel reporting made possible through technological changes 
and the expansion of the new media. This article applies a historical and comparative approach in 
order to both trace these developments over time and to account for particularities in national 
patterns. Eric W. Rothenbuhler advocated that we study mediatization through “historical and 
comparative studies. … How else could we know [that] it is the media and not something else 
that produced the historical change other than through comparative study?”8 
The analysis of the media’s influence on wars and wartime reporting has become more 
urgent as the media have become ever more integral to the military strategy and the conduct of 
warfare. Central to my inquiry are the questions of how and to what degree media war reporting 
changed from the Vietnam to the Iraq War and what impact this had on reporters, combatants, 
and home audiences. Did military strategies change due to the enhanced media presence? How 
did the general public learn about these wars, and how did they respond to these strategies? 
Finally, has the relationship between the government, the military, and the media changed 
significantly?  
This article argues that the mediatization of war significantly accelerated with the news 
coverage of the Vietnam War and reached unprecedented levels during the Iraq War of 2003. 
Therefore, just as media scholars have described the media as the “Fourth Estate” (next to the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches) in order to highlight its importance for the 
functioning of the political democratic system, what has emerged by the turn of the 21st century 
was the elevation of the media as the “Fourth Branch” of military operations (beyond the army, 
5 
 
air force and navy). The utilization of the media in all facets of military strategy and information 
operations has become an absolutely essential part of war in the 21st century, and the Iraq War 
has provided us with a glimpse into the future of mediatized warfare and war coverage.  
 
Media Coverage of the Vietnam War in the United States and West Germany 
 Today we remember the Vietnam War as the first televised war. This is no doubt 
accurate, as long as we keep in mind that this is a more fitting description for the United States 
than other countries, including nations in Western Europe. By the late 1950s, television had 
already taken the United States by storm. When it came to news reporting, American television 
took a slight lead over newspapers as early as 1964. By 1972, 48 of Americans chose television 
as their favorite news medium while only 21 percent preferred newspapers.9  
By comparison, the development of television as an entertainment and information 
medium was delayed by almost a decade in West Germany. In 1961, only one in four West 
German families owned a TV. By the late 1960s, roughly 75 percent of all homes were equipped 
with a television set, which is when TV news began to displace the radio and newspapers as the 
primary information media.10 Therefore, West Germans relied more heavily on the newspapers 
to learn about political news, especially during the first half of the Vietnam War. The other major 
difference between the United States and the Federal Republic was that America was a 
combatant while West Germany never sent any troops to Vietnam. Unsurprisingly, media 
scholars have found that the media of combatant countries are usually less critical and more 
supportive of wars than those of non-combatants.11 What is rather astonishing in this context is 
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that the reporting on the Vietnam War in the United States was initially more critical than in 
West Germany. Why was this the case? 
The short answer is that West Germany was more tightly bound by the Cold War 
ideology than any other West European nation. Located on the front lines of the battle against 
communism, West German politicians were keenly aware of the dangers of communist 
aggression. The containment of the communist foe had provided the unifying foundation for 
U.S.-West German relations since the end of World War II.12 American and West German 
politicians ritualistically paid homage to this fact in the early 1960s. Shortly after taking office in 
1963, for example, Lyndon B. Johnson affirmed the continuation of John F. Kennedy’s vigorous 
anti-communist policies: “This nation will keep its promises from South Vietnam to West 
Berlin.” Such messages were well received in the Federal Republic. For the majority of the West 
German population there was little doubt that the freedom of their country and the security of 
West Berlin were defended in the jungles of Indochina. This “nexus between South Vietnam and 
West Germany” was the bedrock of American-German relations in connection with Vietnam and 
was repeated by politicians and commentators across the political spectrum. 13 
When it came to reporting the early Vietnam War, American newspapers in the years 
from 1962 to 1965 were rather accurate. The leading American media reflected the tumultuous 
crises and far-reaching decisions which the United States government was deliberating at that 
time. While overall supportive of the U.S. government and military, they captured the ambiguous 
situation in 1964, which was shared by members of Congress and the American public. Yet few 
newspapers officially broke with the government policy like the New York Times, which as early 
as 1965 called for a negotiated settlement instead of increased escalation.14 
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 West German newspapers viewed the war fairly consistently through the lens of the 
containment doctrine. Most prestigious newspapers also deployed the accompanying domino 
theory in a myriad of ways to support America’s stance in Vietnam, repeatedly alluding to the 
threat of an aggressive communist China. As one journalist in the prominent Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung warned in March of 1964, “If Beijing is successful with its [expansionist] 
strategy in this part of the world, it will have a significant impact on the radical revolutionary 
movements especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.” Even more broadly was the 
endorsement of the influential weekly, Die Zeit, in 1965: “The containment of communism in 
Europe was the predominant task of the 1940s and 1950… The containment of China is the 
predominant task of the 1960s and 1970s.”15    
Television coverage was equally supportive of the war in both countries and often more 
closely tied to the Cold War consensus in the early stages of the war. The coverage often read 
like a morality play, pitting good, selfless Americans defending South Vietnamese and 
worldwide freedom against conniving, fanatical Vietcong fighters.16 The daily television news 
reports in West Germany were similarly biased towards the American “crusade for liberty.” In 
hindsight, those in charge of the news reports at the time argue that this kind of reporting was 
typical of the early Vietnam War, when the Cold War rivalry and West Germany’s tensions with 
its East European neighbors dominated foreign affairs and mainstream thinking.17 
 One exception to this conformist reporting style was in-depth political TV programs, 
which emerged slightly earlier in West Germany than in the United States. One of these specialty 
programs was Weltspiegel (Mirror of the World), which premiered in 1963 as a half-hour news 
show. It focused exclusively on foreign affairs and quickly gained a reputation for quality 
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programming and garnered large audiences.18 Though its reports often viewed the Vietnam War 
through the lens of the accepted Cold War paradigm as well, some were quite remarkable for 
their critical tenor. One of these aired in March of 1966, tellingly entitled “The Hopeless War.” 
The opening segment set the tone: “The technical equipment, the firepower and thereby the 
might of the Americans was never more apparent than in the spring of 1966. Never was America 
further away from losing this war—and never further away from winning it.” The reporter 
predicted that the United States would have to send one million soldiers to Vietnam in order to 
effectively turn the tide of war and doubted that this was politically feasible.19 This was a 
remarkable piece of reporting both for its blunt assessment and its questioning analysis, 
especially in early 1966 when West German media were toeing the official government line.  
By 1967, the Vietnam War had settled into its own increasingly predictable and savage 
routine. America and its allies pointed to their successes by having staved off the collapse of the 
South Vietnamese government and temporarily halting the advances of the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) and its North Vietnamese allies. Yet all of this had come at a high cost: by mid-
1967, there were nearly 450,000 American troops in Vietnam, and the pacification measures and 
“search-and-destroy” missions were causing heavy casualties while the war effort was ravishing 
the U.S. treasury. And despite increasingly atrocious bombing campaigns against North 
Vietnam, the enemy was not buckling under the pressure, yet world opinion began to turn 
decisively against the United States. 20 
Well before Walter Cronkite’s famous statement about an inevitable stalemate in 
Vietnam in early 1968, the conditions for such a stalemate were in place. By all accounts, the 
turning point of the Vietnam War was emerging in 1967 already. The Tet Offensive merely 
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functioned as a giant exclamation mark. The erosion of the support for the war was a confluence 
of three distinct yet related factors: “growing divisions in Washington, declining morale among 
American troops in the field, and the spread of the antiwar movement into parts of the political 
mainstream.” Television and the media followed and reflected this increasing trend, but did not 
lead it.21 
The West German media assessed the situation in Vietnam between 1967 and 1969 in a 
very similar manner. Like the American media, its German counterpart vacillated between 
support and criticism, optimism and pessimism, while the skeptical voices were becoming 
markedly louder in 1967. Even papers that had staunchly supported the U.S. parted ways with 
the Johnson administration. By late 1967, articles highlighting the unimaginable magnitude of 
the bombings became increasingly prevalent. As they pointed out, the United States had already 
dropped at least five times as many bombs on North Vietnam as were dropped on Germany 
during all of World War II.22 
There is no doubt that the Tet Offensive of early 1968 produced some of the most 
dramatic television footage up to that point. Gripping pictures of U.S. soldiers under attack or 
injured made the news during the weeks after the initial attacks as well as harrowing video of the 
misery of the South Vietnamese population caught in the crossfire. The fighting was savage and, 
unlike the pictures of American bombing runs, highly personalized. Some of these images 
literally went around the world, and television commentators accompanied them with harsh 
criticisms of the Johnson administration. On February 1, 1968 in a commentary on ABC news, 
Joseph C. Harsch threw every public pronouncement in doubt: “What government officials say 
in private bears little resemblance to the highly orchestrated public good cheer.” The Tet 
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Offensive led to a new portrayal of the Vietnam War on American television. This “new image 
of the war” significantly scaled back the guts-and-glory reporting, references to World War II 
dropped off sharply and “our” war was now simply “the” war. The new consensus was no longer 
to win the war, but to get out of Vietnam by saving face—“peace with honor,” as the Nixon 
campaign would put it.23 
In the West German media, the Tet Offensive led to a similarly sharp reassessment. 
Footage from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front appeared in the West German 
TV reporting in the late 1960s, and it shifted the viewpoint from treacherous Vietcong guerillas 
to the portrayal of brave patriots who withstood the withering attacks of an overpowering 
American goliath. This critical reporting, finally, was capped off by the first reports of the My 
Lai Massacre in 1969, which would dominate a good portion of the news coverage that year.24 
This evolution towards a more critical reporting in West Germany in the late 1960s was 
part of a veritable media revolution. As Christina von Hodenberg has demonstrated, the West 
German public sphere had undergone “a rapid politicization which was part of the ongoing 
socio-cultural democratization of the Federal Republic.” As younger, more engaged journalists 
were coming of age and were taking over the newsrooms in West Germany, the public tenor 
shifted rather swiftly from consensus to conflict. Critical reporting which challenged established 
mainstream views now became the new norm. The “consensus journalism” of the 1950s was 
swept out. A final sign of this novel news ethos and critical reporting was that the new 
generation of journalists actually welcomed the protests and rebellion, which they saw as part 
and parcel of a critical public sphere long overdue in West Germany.25 
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The Mediatization of the Vietnam War 
 In August 1968, more than half of all Americans called the war a mistake, and by 
October 1969, a majority considered it morally indefensible. The news coverage of the U.S. 
media both reflected and accelerated this shift in public opinion but did not cause it. In West 
Germany, the Tet Offensive and the revelations of U.S. atrocities reported in 1969 caused a 
similar revision. Not only did the ideological differences of the West German media become 
more pronounced, but more journalists were moving towards critical or even outright 
oppositional reporting. In the influential weekly magazine Der Spiegel, for example, criticism 
and negative reporting focusing on U.S. militarism and deep societal flaws dominated the 
reporting on Vietnam between 1970 and 1972. A final trope of reporting, which gained more 
currency as the war continued, was the indirect blurring of Nazi war crimes and American 
atrocities. Reports of the use of chemical warfare by the United States, the bombing campaigns, 
and the mass killings of innocent civilians merged with the domestic discourse of Nazi crimes in 
West Germany.26 Vietnam was increasingly viewed as an unjustifiable, immoral and 
reprehensible war. 
 This comparison between the media coverage in the two countries further calls into 
question the power of television reporting as a cause for the increasing opposition to the war. 
The impact of “the living room war” on the West German public was far more muted than that in 
the United States, and yet the opposition against the war increased just as much. This adds 
further credence to the argument that the TV coverage accelerated opposition to the war, yet it 
did not cause America’s military defeat.27 In many ways, this accelerator effect of the media and 
television coverage was similar to other mediatized conflicts of the 1960s. As Todd Gitlin has 
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highlighted, the student movement was propelled towards ever more spectacular demonstrations, 
which ultimately led to the celebrity of the few at the cost of the organizational cohesion of the 
movement. Likewise, the Civil Rights Movement partially relied on the use of “dramaturgical” 
framing of their demonstrations, knowing full well that the racist outbursts against nonviolent 
protestors would be captured by cameramen and replayed on American television screens. In 
both of these cases, the media accelerated emerging developments but neither created them nor 
decided the final outcome.28 
 Moreover, the television footage that Americans or Germans saw on Vietnam was neither 
live nor unedited. It took 30 hours for film reports from Vietnam to be shipped, edited and 
cleared for American TV screens. In his analysis of TV news programs between 1968 and 1973, 
Oscar Patterson found “little graphic coverage” in the TV daily reports. As he concluded, “a 
form of selective perception (and more importantly selective retention) on the part of the general 
public of certain highly dramatic events has led to the projection of those as characteristic of 
television coverage of the Vietnam war to a far greater extent than was actually true.” 29 
 One of the defining patterns of our mediatized societies might well be its ability to create 
a “new memory” of events through repeatedly replaying iconic images and film footage. For 
example, the majority of Americans believe that they witnessed the assassination of John F. 
Kennedy live on television in 1963, even though the Zapruder film was not available for viewing 
until five years after the event.30 Something similar has happened in connection with the 
Vietnam War: iconic images, documentary footage and feature films have forever altered the 
memory of what was actually seen on television at the time.  The “new memory” of the Vietnam 
War has effectively replaced the historical record.   
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Overall, the Vietnam War has rightly been viewed as a significant acceleration of the 
mediatization of war.  But the media reporting did not determine the outcome of the war. 
Ironically, though, the lessons which military and political leaders in the United States and 
elsewhere applied in the next wars were to no small measure based on the historical fallacy of 
the media’s decisive impact. 
 
Interlude: The Gulf War of 1991 in the American and German Media 
If Vietnam was the first televised war, the Gulf War of 1991 was the first live television 
war. There was only one problem: there was very little live TV coverage of actual fighting 
because reporters were effectively barred from the battlefield.  In fact, the coverage of the Gulf 
War was almost devoid of any live objects: neither the American or Iraqi soldiers nor the Iraqi 
civilian population were depicted.  It was, as many scholars have argued, primarily “a techno 
war,” “a virtual war” dominated by the prowess of military hardware.  Footage of bombs 
illuminated the Baghdad night sky and precision smart bombs which hit their targets without 
fail—those were the images which dominated the live TV coverage during the few months of the 
Gulf War in the United States, Germany, and much of the rest of the world.31 
It was a mediatized war controlled by the American military and U.S. media dominance. 
The leaders in the Pentagon and the White House had learned the alleged lessons of the Vietnam 
War: control the media coverage by denying reporters access to the theater of war. Instead, select 
groups of reporters were organized into pools and allowed access to sites in groups and 
accompanied by military guides. “Operation Desert Storm,” which was the code name for the 
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campaign turned into “Operation Desert Muzzle,” as John R. MacArthur has phrased it, where 
“the journalists in the Gulf were reduced to the level of stenographers.”32 
In Germany, the tenor of the media coverage sounded very similar. One steady criticism 
was that the German media, television in particular, had relied too much on the CNN version of 
the war. Many analysts and journalists alike argued that the war coverage was largely devoid of 
serious news content. The media coverage had all the elements of a “macabre video game,” they 
argued, which repeatedly showed successful smart bombs hitting their targets, yet shed no light 
on the collateral damage created by the vast majority of “un-smart” bombs.33 Likewise, since the 
reporting was driven by commercial incentives, the dynamics of the coverage disintegrated into 
infotainment where the reality and brutality of war receded into the background.34  
The Gulf War of 1991 was the last war in which the military could effectively control the 
media and almost completely dominate the international coverage. In the media environment of 
the 21st century, this level of military censorship is no longer possible. In little more than ten 
years, mediatization took a quantum leap forward, largely due to the development of the internet 
and social media, new cell phone and satellite technology as well as the emergence of global 
rival news networks. As a result, mediatized war would never be the same. 
 
Media Coverage of the Iraq War in Germany and the United States 
Germany was one of many European countries that did not join the American-led 
“coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 2003. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed 
his opposition to the military invasion in the fall of 2002. His stance reflected the opinion of the 
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vast majority of Germans and significantly helped his re-election that year. However, Germany 
had consistently supported the other war at the time, the war in Afghanistan. This, in fact, 
highlighted the consistent policy of Germany as well as a significant number of European and 
NATO countries: support for the war in Afghanistan, yet opposition to the war in Iraq.35 
What did the media coverage of the Iraq War in Germany look like, then? To start with, 
all German TV channels covered the pre-war phase as well as the initial military campaigns in 
great detail. Especially the reporting of the opening phase of the war was similar to the coverage 
in the United States. German television stations highlighted the initial “shock and awe” 
campaign, and all of them had embedded reporters with coalition forces.  What was apparent as 
well, however, was that German journalists did not want to repeat the mistakes of the first Gulf 
War when the war had been dominated by the “CNN show.”36 The fact that Germany was not 
actively engaged in the Iraq War and that the majority of the German public opposed it 
encouraged journalists to put their principles into action. 
One of the noticeable differences in the two countries was how little use German 
television stations made of reports from their embedded reporters. Only about 2-4 percent of all 
reports during the height of the fighting were based on embedded journalists. Considering how 
enticing it was to use this live footage, this percentage is very low indeed. This voluntary 
restraint was predicated on the skeptical assessment of this military news coverage. Most 
German media severely criticized this new strategy and predicted that it would lead to biased and 
one-sided reporting. This general suspicion was further supported by a widely reported incident 
when an embedded journalist for the German RTL TV channel slipped into a casual “we” while 
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reporting the advance of an American unit: “We have the most modern military equipment in the 
world.”37 
The second major distinction of the German TV coverage of the Iraq War was the 
purposefully broad and varied use of foreign media footage. Instead of relying solely on CNN or 
American footage, German TV stations drew from multiple foreign sources to present a more 
nuanced picture of the war: nearly 40% came from U.S. and British channels, slightly more than 
40% originated from Arab news channels and about 15% of coverage relied on Iraqi sources. 
Small percentages also came from Iran, France and Turkey. Most surprising is the fact that the 
inclusion of American footage was slightly less frequent than news from Arab stations, mainly 
Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV. The most important factor driving this development was the 
deliberate decision by the German media not to overlook the civilian victims and the “collateral” 
damage, and Arab media were most inclined to highlight this aspect of the war. 38 
The third factor which provided a constant check on German TV coverage was that print 
journalists were watching their television colleagues closely. While self-reflective news coverage 
of crisis situations was not new, the degree of public analysis reached unprecedented levels. In a 
four-month period in early 2003, for example, roughly 15% of all war-related articles discussed 
the nature of the reporting or highlighted limitations of the media coverage. The medium most 
criticized was television. The majority of these articles focused on German media (roughly 30 
percent), approximately 20 percent of took aim at American reporting whereas 10-12 percent 
were directed against Arab news channels. The most common criticism was the partisan and one-
sided reporting. While the broad-based denunciation of Iraqi news coverage was hardly 
surprising, the strong and near unanimous criticism of U.S. media in the German press was 
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noteworthy. The most frequent criticism was that American media rarely showed pictures of 
civilian casualties and employed significant self-censorship.39 
Particularly controversial was the handling of images of captured and dead U.S. soldiers 
compared with the footage of dead and mutilated Iraqi civilians. One such incidence occurred on 
March 23, 2003, when 29 U.S. soldiers were killed and six were captured. The footage of 
captured US prisoners and dead American soldiers was distributed by Al-Jazeera. All German 
TV stations broadcast parts of it, although usually only in the form of photographs. The appeal 
by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who requested that these images not be shown, was 
widely denounced as were most mainstream American media which went along with his 
request.40 
 The coverage of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel provides a further case in point. The 
impact of the war on Iraqi citizens quickly became a major focal point in its war coverage. Even 
though the magazine held Saddam Hussein primarily responsible for the war and even described 
him as a “paranoid despot,” the arguments for the use of military force by the Bush 
administration were summarily rejected. What is significant as well was the magazine’s frontal 
assault on the American claim that the Iraq War was an integral part of the “War on Terror.” In a 
very similar vein, the use of spectacular, Hollywood-inspired footage like the rescue of Jessica 
Lynch remained continually suspect in the German media.41 
 Overall, this pronounced antiwar reporting in the German media during the Iraq War is 
highlighted in international comparisons as well. A study which compared the television news in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany found that Germany’s television reports 
were the most critical in their coverage and focused most on casualties suffered by the Iraqi 
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population. In the United States, by contrast, the emphases were exactly reversed, with the vast 
majority of reports in support of the military campaigns while very little attention was being paid 
to Iraq civilian casualties. The BBC coverage held down the golden middle, with roughly equal 
coverage of these two topics.42 
 While the German media as a whole thus reflected an oppositional reporting of the war, 
there is little doubt that the media in the United States were far too deferential to the Bush 
administration. The vaunted media watchdog, as most observers argued, had become the demure 
government lap dog. The one word most frequently cited to summarize the performance of the 
American media during the Iraq War, as even a cursory survey of book titles will attest, was 
“failure:” When the Press Fails, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us, So Wrong For 
So Long, and so forth.43 
 The list of omissions is long indeed. Most important was the media’s failure to set the 
record straight in terms of Iraq’s lack of involvement with the 9/11 attacks. In October 2002, 
two-thirds of all Americans believed that Saddam Hussein had helped the terrorists carry out the 
attacks on 9/11, and roughly the same number of Americans believed that Iraq was close to 
developing nuclear weapons and possessed biological and chemical arsenals. After an aggressive 
communications strategy by the White House, 70% of Americans supported military action in 
January of 2003. In hindsight, several American media admitted their inadequate news coverage 
leading up to the war, which led to the unprecedented step of both the New York Times and the 
Washington Post publicly apologizing to their readers. Likewise, critics have rightly pointed out 
that the American media were far too deferential to U.S. political and military leaders.44 
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 While the soul-searching about the media’s failure during the Iraq War will undoubtedly 
continue, a number of conclusions have already surfaced. The first of these confirms what media 
researchers have been saying for a while: when a country is determined to go to war, its media 
find it difficult—if not impossible—to resist the call to arms. “[Especially] once a war begins,” 
as William Dorman has pointed out, “critical thinking in any society, free or not, becomes 
virtually impossible.” Whether one calls it groupthink or the power of political and ideological 
consensus, the dynamics of these forces are hard to challenge. 45 A wide variety of factors have 
further increased this pervasive trend. The ratings war and shrinking newspaper readership have 
reduced the ability of journalists to challenge politicians on issues which enjoy wide popular 
support. In addition, the White House pursued an aggressive communications strategy which 
gradually built a solid consensus behind the war, and anyone who dared question the evidence 
was targeted, marginalized or ostracized. Lastly, in the aftermath of 9/11 the volatility of the 
country and the patriotism which permeated every aspect of the national culture played directly 
into the hands of war proponents and gave them additional leverage.46 
Finally, the American media system has always worked best within a functioning, 
oppositional political framework. As the reporting on the Vietnam War highlighted, the majority 
of the media shifted its reporting in tandem with the increasing opposition to the war. Not 
coincidentally, the “golden age of journalism” in the United States in the late 1960s and early 
1970s was also a time period of deep disagreement about the political priorities of the nation, 
which provided cover for a more critical and oppositional media.47 
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The Mediatization of the Iraq War 
If so much stayed the same in connection with the American media coverage of the Iraq 
War, why should we consider it a new chapter in the mediatization of war? Part of the answer is 
that U.S. media coverage was not representational of the rest of the world. The irony of this was 
that the most advanced and technologically developed country actually saw one of the most 
traditional versions of this war. The tight domestic consensus led to a significant self-censorship 
by American reporters and editors and ultimately produced a rather one-dimensional view of the 
war. As the German case indicated, however, that was not what the rest of the world saw. 
The Iraq War represents a new chapter in the mediatization of the war because the media 
indeed functioned increasingly as the fourth branch of military operations. The key components 
of this transformation are related to three overarching developments: the emergence of rival 
global news networks and the creation of an oppositional global public sphere; the 
professionalization of the military information strategies and warfare, which included the 
utilization of embedded reporters; and, finally, the emergence of the internet both as a medium 
for alternative news sources as well as an arena for expanded warfare in the form of cyberwar. 
The first of these is one of the most discussed changes of the media war. The global news 
monopoly which CNN enjoyed in the early 1990s lasted only briefly. Since the mid-1990s a host 
of new global satellite news channels have emerged, and none has attracted more attention than 
the rise of Al-Jazeera. To many Western viewers Al-Jazeera is known primarily through its 
release of the Osama bin Laden tapes as well as its critical coverage of the Iraq War. Because of 
this oppositional reporting, the network quickly acquired the reputation of “Osama’s 
mouthpiece” or “Taliban TV” in the United States especially. During the Iraq War, Rumsfeld 
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dismissed it as “Jihad-TV.” These characterizations highlight the degree of frustration on the part 
of political opponents and indicate the significant cross-currents which Al-Jazeera created.48 
Despite the ongoing controversy over the reporting by Al-Jazeera, the vast majority of 
observers point out that the new Arab channel is a reputable news source. By the time of the Iraq 
War, 35 million households in the Arab world watched it on a regular basis, and it emerged as a 
provider of news for Western networks as well. In addition, Al-Jazeera has rightly been called 
“an equal opportunity offender.” In a region where most news outlets are controlled by political 
leaders and governments, Al-Jazeera has been roundly criticized and frequently censored by 
Arab governments for its critical style of reporting.49 
 In the case of the Iraq War, Al-Jazeera’s focus was on the impact of the war on the Iraqi 
civilian population. Its images of the wounded and dead made the rounds through Arab as well 
as western countries. The decision to release often graphic images was partly driven by the Arab 
media environment, where Al-Jazeera was competing with Al-Arabiya and Abu Dhabi 
television. However, it was also fueled by sense of hypocrisy, since Western media were often 
squeamish about showing the dead soldiers of coalition forces, yet showed no such scruples 
when it came to displaying Iraqi dead and wounded. Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawary 
have described the reporting style of Al-Jazeera as “contextualized objectivity.” By this they 
mean that the network strives for fair and balanced reporting, yet like all other global news 
channels is inextricably linked to the dominant political perspectives of its viewers and driven by 
competitive market forces within its region.50 
 The new global media rivalry has forever changed how future wars will be covered. As 
the American and Western media dominance recedes, competing rival networks are emerging all 
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around the globe. The “post-American world,” a term which Fareed Zakaria uses to discuss the 
relative decline of American political influence as new economic and political powers emerge, is 
reflected in the global shift of war coverage as well. It is bound to remain an integral aspect and 
ongoing flashpoint of 21st-century mediatized war.51 
 Second, many observers have pointed to the enhanced professionalization of the media 
management before and during recent wars. The reason for this accelerated trend is that no 
government or military, not even the Pentagon, can any longer control the visual imagery of war. 
The best governments can hope for is to shape global and domestic public opinion in their favor 
by dominating the war coverage with favorable footage. The new wartime trend is towards 
“information warfare,” which includes both “informational operations” and “perception 
management.” The ultimate goal is to dominate the communications networks and to utilize the 
media to one’s own advantage.52 
 In connection with the Iraq War, the core issue which has emerged as one of the main 
media controversy was the Pentagon strategy of embedding reporters with coalition troops. 
While not entirely new, this integration of journalists with army units was planned far ahead and 
reflected the realization on the part of the U.S. Defense Department that it would not be able to 
recreate the pool system of the first Gulf War. The military planners took their chances hoping 
that the embedding of reporters would provide a steady stream of riveting, positive images of the 
military campaign. As most observers agree, the strategy proved successful. When it came to 
feeding the unrelenting 24-hour news media cycle, the strategy of embedding journalists satisfied 
this media appetite and proved effective in delivering popular footage. Yet is also created a 
partial illusion of war and narrowly focused reports which lacked both context and analysis.53 
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 The third major shift in the nature of mediatized war is the development and increasing 
significance of the Internet and the social media. To start with, as Philip Seib argues, “Cyber 
warfare is not science fiction; the first attacks have already occurred.” While there is no evidence 
of government involvement in any of the cyber attacks during the Iraq War, both high-profile 
Arab as well as U.S. government web sites came under attack as did web sites of Islamist and 
antiwar organizations. It is easy to imagine that we have just seen the beginnings of the usage of 
cyber warfare by both private parties and governmental agencies.54 
 In addition, warblogs became widespread through the Iraq War because they brought 
readers close to the action. Unlike embedded reporters, they had the advantage of providing 
alternative news sources. The most famous warblog of the Iraq War was written by a twenty-
nine-year-old Iraqi architect, who reported under the pseudonym Salam Pax. During early part of 
the war, the site attracted over 100,000 visitors per day. Such blogs created a heavy dose of 
verisimilitude and readers quite literally felt that they were closer to the action. The same is true 
for the many warblogs written by soldiers, which began to appear in ever greater number. In 
addition, the Internet also served as an organizing tool for grassroots journalists and antiwar 
activists by creating websites which challenged the official version of the war.55 
 There certainly are additional aspects which could be added here which are an integral 
part of the enhanced mediatization of 21st-century warfare. The increased targeting of specific 
reporters and news channels; the accelerating speed and immediacy of television reporting in the 
competitive 24-hour news cycle; the greatly expanded self-reflexivity of the media (media 
monitoring and patrolling themselves); the expansion of social media as well as the noticeable 
focus on the visual imagery of the Gulf and Iraq Wars—all of these point in the same direction. 
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Together with the three broad transformations discussed earlier, they highlight that we have 
indeed entered a new stage of mediatized war. As the New York Times commented, we have seen 
“the first real war of the Information Age.”56 While some of these developments, especially the 
impact of the internet, are still in the early stages, it has provided us with a glimpse into the 
nature of future mediatized warfare. 
 
Conclusion 
Mediatization is an ongoing historical development and accelerating process which is 
reshaping our society, politics and everyday lives by making the media ever more powerful and 
integral. Wars have become increasingly mediatized as a part of this dynamic. This has 
significantly altered many aspects of military strategy and warfare as both the media coverage of 
the Vietnam and Iraq Wars demonstrate. 
 This article has analyzed the accelerated mediatization of war over the past fifty years. 
The focus was on a comparative view of the media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars in the 
United States and Germany. The purpose of this historical and comparative approach was to 
identify some of the patterns of the mediatization of war while simultaneously recognizing 
particular national characteristics. As this study shows, the developments are neither uniform nor 
unidirectional, depending on the cultural and historical circumstances. 
 What does all of this mean for the future relationship between the media, the public and 
governments before and during wartime? We can draw some significant parallels between the 
mediatization of war and the mediatization of politics here. In their research, Gianpietro 
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Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz summed up the relationship between media and politics in the 
following manner: “The best description of the current situation is ‘mediatization,’ where 
political institutions increasingly are dependent on and shaped by the mass media but 
nevertheless remain in control of political processes and functions.”57 
 This squares closely with the findings of my study. Even during the Iraq War, as the 
global media landscape became more competitive and divisive, most national media reflected the 
political consensus within their countries. A comparative study of television coverage in 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and India has demonstrated that more than 75 
percent of reports in these respective countries stayed within the national consensus while only 
about 20 percent were critical or oppositional to dominant political and public sentiments. Denis 
McQuail comes to a similar assessment. The mediatization of war has made the information 
strategies and control ever more imperative and difficult for governments, but he tempers this by 
concluding: “Perhaps most important is still the fact that the mainstream media do not on the 
whole represent any real threat to governments that can plausibly claim to be acting in the 
national interest and with public support.”58 
 The utilization of the media has indeed accelerated over the past fifty years. The 
mediatization of Vietnam War has found expression in the phrases “the first television war” or 
“living room war.” During the Iraq War, the rise of new global media networks, the enhanced 
information warfare and the expansion of the internet have further advanced the integration of 
the media into the military strategy of warfare. Some are suggesting that we capture this new 
stage of mediatization with terms like “the first digital network war” or “the first war of the 
Information Age.” All of this implies significant and important developments which need further 
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investigation. Yet is also leaves us with the important reminder that neither the media nor the 
dynamic forces of mediatization will be sufficient to prevent the next war of choice. 
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